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A critical component of strategic thinking is the study of how new capabilities and concepts 
are disseminated in a multi- or bilateral strategic relationship. The United States is a consistent 
leader in developing and introducing new capabilities and must therefore constantly reassess how 
its own strategic concepts and assumptions are disseminated to and understood by other actors in 
the international system. Without common strategic understandings, stability can be tenuous; when 
assumptions about common strategic understandings prove to be untrue, stability can easily be 
imperiled.  At present, developments in two of the most important and novel domains, space and 
cyberspace, are changing the way the Asia-Pacific understands strategic problems, with important 
consequences for both nuclear and cross-domain stability.   
The Asia-Pacific is home to five treaty allies, five nuclear powers, and several countries with 
a latent (or near-latent) nuclear capability.1 Its expanding geopolitical importance and military 
significance are well recognized, as evidenced by efforts by the United States to rebalance its 
military and diplomatic attention toward the region. Less well understood, however, is how 
emerging strategic dynamics within space and cyberspace will affect regional strategic stability. 
Navigating the complexities of this shifting strategic environment will be critical to the future 
stability and prosperity of the region, as well as the United States. In this context, in January 2016 
the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) convened a series of workshops on space and 
strategic stability, and cyberspace and strategic stability, bringing together regional experts to 
discuss some of these issues. Roy Kamphausen (NBR) served as the Project Director, and Bruce 
                                                          
1 Not including the United States itself, states with nuclear weapons include China, India, North Korea, Pakistan, 
and Russia. Japan is most frequently identified as a latent nuclear power, but both South Korea and Taiwan might 
have the capability to build a weapon within a fairly short timeframe.  
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MacDonald (Johns Hopkins SAIS) and Elbridge Colby (Center for a New American Progress) 




The implications of space and cyberspace for strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific has not 
been deeply investigated in either a formal or informal multilateral setting. Although discussions 
of space systems and strategic stability, and separately cyberspace and strategic stability, take place 
in bilateral settings, a multilateral format provides opportunities for better understanding complex 
strategic interactions, addressing the diversity of national perspectives and priorities, and 
developing a group of experts inside and outside of government who discuss the issues in common 
ways. As the global geopolitical center of gravity continues to shift to the Asia-Pacific, building a 
multilateral cohort with a shared lexicon and a common set of concepts is crucial to the security 
and prosperity of the United States and the region.  
The “Space, Cyberspace, and Strategic Stability in the Asia-Pacific” workshops hosted by 
NBR were designed to fill the gap of multilateral dialogues on these issues. The workshops brought 
together experts in space security and strategic issues at one dialogue, and cyber security and 
strategic issues at another dialogue, with participants from across the Asia-Pacific. Nations 
represented included China, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, and the United States, and 
participants included think tank scholars, retired military, academics, and researchers for quasi-
governmental organizations.  
In these one and a half day workshops, NBR utilized a facilitated dialogue amongst experts 
to explore the foundational issues in these domains and identify any existing common 
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understandings. Overall, the dialogues found that the major space and cyberspace actors of the 
Asia-Pacific have evolving conceptions of strategic stability and are not accustomed to discussing 
the strategic implications of new capabilities in the space and cyberspace domains. While experts 
often preferred to stay within the bounds of their own established research, the facilitated nature 
of the dialogue meant that workshop organizers could, at times, prompt participants to consider 
longer-term strategic implications. The cohort of workshop attendees then engaged in deeper 
discussion and drew on their technical and policy expertise to raise new problems and identify 
issues they hope to discuss with foreign and domestic colleagues in more depth. 
Follow-on efforts to this project would seek to deepen the level of discussion on these issues 
beyond the superficial, particularly by defining some key terms which stymied these first 
workshop discussions. A future effort would focus on exploring common definitions and further 
developing a cohort of multilateral participants who are more prepared to talk about these issues 
in a similar, agreed upon way. A cohort of specialists across the region that share a common 
understanding of emerging concepts and dynamics will do much to reduce potential instability, 
although this is just a first step.    
The next section of this report provides some background on the issues discussed during the 
space and cyberspace workshops. Each section concludes with some of the workshop findings 
identified by the project’s senior advisors, which highlight their impressions of the workshops’ 







Space and Strategic Stability in the Asia-Pacific 
 
Although space capabilities have long been a familiar variable in the strategic equation, the 
challenge of understanding the linkages connecting space with strategic stability—including in the 
nuclear domain—has become more difficult due to three trends. The first is the emergence of new 
spacefaring nations and the spread of anti-space capabilities. The second is the increasing 
importance of space for military operations at the tactical level, in contrast with the prior dedication 
of space systems primarily for strategic purposes. The third trend is the rapid improvement in 
commercial space capabilities, leading to greater government reliance for resilience purposes and 
lending increased rule-making authority to commercial actors. These three trends are of particular 
concern in the Asia-Pacific because many of the new entrants in space are located in this dynamic 
region and because regional strategic stability has long been upheld by a space-enabled nuclear 
and conventional status quo, the most important pillar of which has been U.S. military superiority. 
Space systems and the orbits they inhabit are vital enablers of modern economic, social, and 
strategic capabilities. In its last triennial report on the subject, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development estimated that the space economy generated total revenues of over 
$256.2 billion in 2013, including $21.6 billion in services provided by satellite operators and 
$149.6 billion in economic activity reliant on space capabilities. 2  Space systems provide 
communications, navigation and positioning, earth observation, and other services that are unique 
and in increasing demand in the global economy. Thus, much like a maritime strait or a limited 
natural resource, space is a global commons to be managed and protected from accidental abuse—
                                                          
2 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), The Space Economy at a Glance 2014 (Paris: 
OECD Publishing, 2014), 16–17. 
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the most pressing risk being the more than 500,000 pieces of space debris orbiting earth.3 And as 
a vibrant sphere of booming economic activity, space systems present enticing targets for strategic 
coercion.  
Taking hostage the economic value of space would, however, only present itself as an 
attractive counter-value strategy for a desperate isolated antagonist that has little to lose from the 
diplomatic and economic fallout. The much more pressing problem is the possibility of the space 
economy becoming collateral damage in an anti-space campaign that is waged as part of a broader 
conventional—or nuclear—conflict. The likelihood of this possibility has increased over the last 
two decades as the role of space capabilities has shifted from primarily supporting strategic 
systems to enabling the precision-strike capabilities, global power-projection, and augmented 
intelligence-collection capabilities that underpin U.S. conventional superiority. During the Cold 
War, military satellites were largely devoted to supporting critical strategic deterrence missions—
for example, performing command and control and early-warning functions. Thus, an attack on 
military satellites was mutually understood as a clear escalation to the nuclear level, likely only 
ever rational as the overture to a first strike. Space was therefore included—and protected—on the 
far side of the break in the escalation ladder between conventional and nuclear war.  
Until the beginning of the 21st century, the U.S. government held a sanguine view of threats 
in space and displayed a measured optimism about the United States’ ability to manage those 
threats. However, in recent years the tone of high-level officials, including Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Robert Work, Under Secretary of Defense Frank Kendall, and Air Force Space 
                                                          
3 As of 2013, of the more than 500,000 pieces of space debris, over 20,000 pieces are larger than ten centimeters in 
diameter. See the statistics in Mark Garcia, ed., “Space Debris and Human Spacecraft,” National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, September 26, 2013, http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html; 





Commander General John E. Hyten, when discussing future threats has changed. According to 
Work, “Our space assets are now at more risk than they have ever been. Our global command and 
control system is at more risk than it has ever been.”4 Potential adversaries now see space as the 
soft underbelly of U.S. conventional superiority and are developing anti-satellite (ASAT) systems 
to hold both low-earth and geostationary orbits at risk. In 2007, China used a direct-ascent kinetic 
ASAT weapon to destroy a weather satellite, and it has since tested a system that can nearly reach 
geosynchronous orbits.5 In the last three years, Russia has launched and maneuvered a number of 
satellites that could function as co-orbital ASAT weapons, including one military satellite that 
entered geostationary orbit.6  The deployment of ASAT capabilities thus creates a deterrence 
problem for the United States that it has not previously faced. Without a credible strategy for the 
United States to deter attacks against space assets, an adversary would possess enormous 
incentives to eliminate U.S. satellites if a conventional conflict were already inevitable.7 
While the primary source of concern for U.S. policymakers has been the vulnerability of 
satellites in low-earth orbit supporting conventional military operations, there is growing concern 
about the nuclear command and control satellites in geostationary orbit as well. If this concern is 
                                                          
4 Robert O. Work, “Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech” (speech delivered at the McAleese/Credit Suisse Defense 
Programs Conference, Washington, D.C., March 17, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-
View/Article/606653/mcaleesecredit-suisse-defense-programs-conference. 
5 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People’s Republic of China 2015 (Washington, D.C., April 7, 2015), 14. 
6 Brian Weeden, “Dancing in the Dark Redux: Recent Russian Rendezvous and Proximity Operations in Space,” 
Space Review, October 5, 2015, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2839/1; and Jana Honkova, “The Russian 
Federation’s Approach to Military Space and Its Military Space Capabilities,” George C. Marshall Institute Policy 
Outlook, November 2013, 35–40. 
7 Forrest E. Morgan, Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment (Santa Monica: 
RAND Corporation, 2010), 28. 
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real—and external assessment of that possibility is for good reason impaired by classification—
the strategic implications, though interrelated, would be distinct. 
At the same time, both allies and potential adversaries are building their own satellite-
enabled conventional-strike forces. Besides China, Japan is now also a mature space power, while 
South Korea and India are quickly catching up. The proliferation of satellite capabilities offering 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); positioning and navigation; command and 
control; targeting; and other military functions has created a two-pronged problem for Washington: 
potential opponents’ strike capabilities are improving, and the incentives for regional powers to 
develop their own ASAT capabilities are also increasing. In the face of the Chinese conventional-
strike threat, for example, U.S. partners and allies may find it tempting to incorporate ASAT into 
their own conventional military doctrines, with unpredictable consequences for crisis stability. 
These concerns are particularly intense in the Asia-Pacific, where geopolitical conditions are 
evolving, driven by the rise of China—a nation set apart by the coupling of an enormous economy 
with a troubled history of relations along its borders. Rivalry and competition generated by this 
evolution contribute toward increased spending on military modernization in the face of prevailing 
global trends.8  
Given deteriorating confidence in the stability of space as a strategic domain, states have 
pursued both unilateral efforts to defend against or deter conflict in space and multilateral efforts 
to create norms of behavior around which stability can be re-established. Strategies for defending 
against ASAT systems include improving space situational awareness (SSA), dispersing functions 
                                                          
8 The other regional exception to the trend of decreasing military spending is Eastern Europe. For more on this, see 
Sam Perlo-Freeman, Aude Fleurant, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman, “Trends in World Military 




among satellites, making satellite functions redundant, installing passive and active defenses on 
satellites, and improving backups for satellite functions in territorial systems.9 Because defense 
will likely be a costly prospect, deterrence remains important as well. Beyond decreasing the 
benefits of an ASAT strategy through better defense, deterrence options might include announcing 
an intention to escalate terrestrially in response to ASAT strikes, sharing satellite functionality 
with other countries to increase the diplomatic costs of ASAT strikes, improving SSA to ensure 
attribution, and developing rapid satellite-constellation reconstitution capabilities.10  
At present, the United States appears to be prioritizing resilience through use of allied and 
commercial satellites. Testifying in March 2016, Douglas Loverro, deputy assistant secretary of 
defense for space policy, noted that reconstitution and defensive operations are less well suited 
than resilience for providing assurances that are both robust and communicable to potential 
adversaries as well as cost-effective.11 
Multilateral options for rebuilding strategic stability in space have centered on two 
competing proposals: the European Union’s Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities and the 
Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of 
                                                          
9 Morgan, Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space, 15, 31–33; Bruce W. MacDonald, “China, Space 
Weapons, and U.S. Security,” Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), CFR Council Special Report, no. 38, 
September 2008, 15–16; Todd Harrison, “The Future of MILSATCOM,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments, 2013, 24–32; and Douglas L. Loverro, “Statement of Mr. Douglas L. Loverro, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Space Policy,” statement before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Washington, D,C., March 12, 2014, 10, http://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Loverro_03-12-14.pdf. 
10 Morgan, Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space, 43, 46–68; MacDonald, “China, Space Weapons, and 
U.S. Security,” 14–16; Harrison, “The Future of MILSATCOM,” 36–43; Douglas L. Loverro, “Fiscal Year 2016 
National Defense Authorization Budget Request for National Security Space Activities,” statement before the 
House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Washington, D.C., March 25, 2016, 4–
11, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=764860; and Elbridge A. Colby, “From Sanctuary to Battlefield: A 
Framework for a U.S. Defense and Deterrence Strategy for Space,” Center for a New American Security, January 
2016, 14–16.  
11 Loverro, “Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Budget Request,” 6–8. 
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Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). Neither proposal has found universal support among 
interested states, although the code of conduct’s future appears slightly less grim. 
One of the challenges that experts face when discussing strategic stability and space 
capabilities with policymakers is the widespread lack of experience with and knowledge of the 
issues, extending particularly to the physics of space systems. This applies to the new entrant 
nations to the space domain as well and may have contributed to the relative lack of national 
dialogue on the strategic implications of space capabilities in the Asia-Pacific. The conclusions 
reached in war games and crisis scenario simulations may mislead decision-makers if opponents 
have arrived at different conclusions in their own exercises. The United States has internalized 
lessons about the dangers of crisis escalation through its simulations, but it may prove dangerous 
to rely on findings from simulations if they incorrectly model the assumptions of potential U.S. 
adversaries. The U.S. space community has still not overcome the challenge of balancing the 
legitimate requirements for secrecy and the pressing need for informed debate and discussion of 
the issues.  
 
Relevant Findings from the Space and Strategic Stability Workshop 
 We can expect a high level of decision-maker uncertainty when contemplating serious 
space offense options, particularly given the newness of the military space domain for the 
emerging powers of the Asia-Pacific, their inexperience with high-end conflict, and the 
uncertainties about the collateral effects of attacks on space assets. This uncertainty is a 
two-edged sword: it may encourage hesitancy in escalation, but could also lead to rapid 
unintended escalation as well. The additional complication of bilateral and multilateral 
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resiliency agreements—such as satellite sharing between partners and allies—also 
generated uncertainty as to consequences for regional stability. 
 
 The development of common multilateral rules of the road, escalatory thresholds, and sets 
of expectations would be very useful, and there seem to be potential areas of agreement that 
could be built upon. Trust and Confidence Building Measures (TCBMs), a code of conduct, 
and dialogues between potential space adversaries are all important and need to be 
encouraged. Anything that can be done in terms of a norm to address the serious 
undesirability of attacking adversary strategic nuclear C3I assets would be useful, though 
this is complicated by the non-strategic uses of such assets.  
 
 The implications of commercial space operations on regional strategic stability may be far 
larger than the current amount of multilateral discussion suggests. The workshop 
participants mentioned how cheap and improving access to satellite imagery and lower-
priced launch options will change regional powers’ strategic options. This subject requires 
far greater analysis and should be a focus in a follow-on study. 
 
 
Cyberspace and Strategic Stability in the Asia-Pacific 
 
Cyberspace remains a domain in which there is little consensus on the nature and severity of 
strategic, nuclear risks. Cybersecurity policy discussions, while increasingly sophisticated, have 
mostly occurred in important sectors of security policy that have few strategic implications, such 
as crime, espionage (both political and commercial), or long-term economic competition, while 
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the relationship between cyberthreats and strategic stability remains relatively unfamiliar territory. 
Correspondingly, while there is a growing consensus about what is possible in the cyber realm, 
there is less agreement on cross-domain implications and how well classic strategic concepts such 
as mutual deterrence, escalation, damage assessment, offensive/defensive dominance, and 
verification of capabilities apply.  
The possibility of deterrence and strategic stability within the cyber domain has begun to 
generate substantial academic debate and policy analysis. A major milestone in that debate—at 
least in the United States—was the establishment of a national cybersecurity strategy that relies on 
both deterrence and defense, as well as new institutions to implement those strategies. However, 
cross-domain risks have not received the same level of focused assessment, and there is little 
systematic study of how cyber operations can create destabilizing effects in the nuclear, space, or 
conventional domains. This is as true in the Asia-Pacific, home to the world’s most dynamic and 
networked societies, as it is in the United States. In the Asia-Pacific, interstate conflict not only 
remains a live possibility but also bears the risk of nuclear escalation. Regional strategic stability 
is in a dynamic state, with technological advances and military investments outpacing shared 
understanding of risk, threat, escalation, and stability. In the cyber domain, the existence of 
clashing interests and challenges to effective cooperation are undeniable. What remains to be 
determined, however, is whether this new arena of competitive state activity will have effects on 







Relevant Findings from the Cyber and Strategic Stability Workshop 
 There was a lack of agreement on the nature and typology of strategic threats emanating 
from the cyber domain. That disagreement may have partially stemmed from the lack of a 
common vocabulary, but it also suggests a divergence in priorities and capabilities. 
 
 Despite a growing degree of confidence in handling modest cyber intrusions, there 
continues to exist uncertainty over the effects of cyberattacks, which could create 
unintended escalation—particularly in a tense crisis situation. Representatives from Asian 
states with weaker cyber capabilities were more alarmed by the unknowable capabilities of 
major cyber powers such as the United States, China, or Russia. Participants from those 
three nations, on the other hand, were more sanguine about stability and also more reluctant 
to discuss the strategic dimensions of cyber operations.  
 
 The set of cross-domain concerns discussed ranged from cyber operations targeting 
nuclear forces and the systems that enable their use (judged unlikely by most, but not all, 
experts) to cyber operations filling in rungs on the escalation ladder (acknowledged as 
problematic and requiring more discussion) and political destabilization through cyber 
operations (that is, stability in a broader sense). Enumerating, categorizing, describing, 
and mapping out these concerns should be the primary goals of future multilateral 
discussions. 
 
 To the extent that participants debated how cooperative processes could mitigate threats 
to strategic stability, the suggestions were generally unmoored from the broader discussion 
of strategic threats. Many of the cooperative initiatives that the participating experts 
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touched on were efforts at improving general cybersecurity cooperation that could have 
salutary effects in the fights against cybercrime and cyberespionage, in addition to 
mitigating the effects of offensive cyberactivities. These ideas, however, were not 
specifically focused on improving stability. To reach a level of conversation that can 
address problems in cooperation on strategic stability in cyberspace would likely require 
greater consensus on the most probable and important threats and challenges. 
 
 
